Since 1991, the U.S. military has participated in Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations in Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia. As a result, U.S. Armed Forces have become increasingly involved in working with a plethora of independent non-military actors during humanitarian relief operations. The unique nature of this relationship is recognized in the Military Operations Other Than War principle of unity of effort. For the Joint Task Force commander (JFC), unity of effort acknowledges the fact that coordination and cooperation replace command and control as guiding principles during HA operations.
To Support the JFC conducting humanitarian relief operations, doctrine has been developed identifying the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) as the engine that drives the coordination process. However, current doctrine is incomplete. While focusing on the who, what, when, why, and how of CMOC operations, guidance discussing where is conspicuously absent.
To optimize unity of effort,--standardized doctrine must be developed and instituted identifying where to physically locate the CMOC during HA operations. Based on the divergent cultures of the participating military and non-military actors, parallel civil-military operations centers located inside and outside the wire offer the best opportunity for optimizing unity of effort between the Joint Task Force and Humanitarian Relief Organizations supporting HA operations. "Achieving interagency and civil interoperability through the continuing development of our doctrine and interagency participation in our training exercises is important to the unity of effort upon which success in many missions depends (emphasis added)" what, when, why, and how of CMOC operations, the jury is still out regarding the where. A review of current and draft joint pubs, field manuals, handbooks, and unified command after action reports find CMOC location recommendations ranging from the JFC's specialized staff inside the wire to collocation with United Nations entities outside the wire. 4 As ensuing discussions will reveal, the lack of doctrine identifying where to physically locate the CMOC complicates endeavors focused on enhancing JTF/HRO unity of effort.
Thesis
JTF/HRO unity of effort can be optimized by instituting a parallel civil-military operations centers concept that collocates the CMOC with the JTF headquarters inside the wire, and a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) with the HROs outside the wire. In this configuration, parallel civil-military operations centers will maximize the two-way flow of information and services between the JTF and HROs, and standardize the organizational framework supporting future HA operations.
This paper supports the above thesis by first examining the unity of effort concept in addition to discussing the roles of the JTF, the HROs, and the CMOC in HA operations. The second section provides a general overview of the HA operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and
Haiti from the CMOC perspective. The third section examines current doctrine regarding the physical location of the CMOC. Based on the findings in sections two and three, section four argues for the establishment of parallel civil-military operations centers inside and outside the wire. Section five discusses counter-arguments to the parallel civil-military operations centers concept. Lastly, the paper closes with concluding comments.
Unity of Effort, the JTF, HROs, and the CMOC Unity of Effort
Because of the cultural differences existing between the U.S. military and civilian relief agencies, unity of effort is one of the most important issues the JFC must contend with during HA operations. Joint Pub 3-07 (JP 3-07), Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, states that:
"achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international foreign and domestic military and non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. This requires that JFCs, or other designated directors of the operation, rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort (emphasis added)."
The importance of attaining unity of effort is based on the fact that, irrespective of their inherent differences, the JTF and HROs share similar goals. as the JTF/HRO central clearing house for information and service requests, the CMOC is the focal point for humanitarian relief operations. 15 Core CMOC functions include:
" (1) coordination with NGOs and other non-military organizations impacting on the mission, (2) receiving, processing, and coordinating requests from these organizations (especially in terms of security and transport), (3) gathering information/intelligence, disseminating information from the military to NGOs, and (4) attempting to focus the efforts of the NGOs in a manner which supports the objectives of the commander." 16 Additional functions include providing access to key military assets while reducing duplication of effort between military and non-military resources. 17 Moreover, "the CMOC represents the military's only institutional chance for accurate feedback on whether or not the humanitarian intent is being met (emphasis added)."
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The CMOC is an ideal mechanism for coordinating the exchange of mutually beneficial information and services between the JTF and HROs. Thus, the CMOC plays a vital role in providing a venue for enhancing civil-military unity of effort during HA operations.
JTF/HRO Relations: Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti
Unity of effort was achieved during Operations RESTORE HOPE, SUPPORT HOPE, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY due to the role the CMOC played as a two-way clearing house for service and information requests . However, CMOC personnel did experience coordination problems with the HROs and JTF staffs. While unity of effort was attained in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, room for improvement exists. implemented to assist HROs in transporting relief supplies worked well, problems existed.
"The military-HRO link-up was not always smooth. When the HRO was delayed, it was sometimes difficult to communicate the delay to the escort before the escort arrived. On occasion, the problem was due to communications difficulties. At other times, it was compounded by the fact that the CMOC, which received HRO calls, was not collocated with the force headquarters, which would often have to notify the command providing the escort (emphasis added NGOs, and requests for support were then sent to the CMOC cell in the J3." 26 The HACC was established for two main reasons. First, the HACC served as an alternate coordination site due to the perception of JTF Haiti planners that many of the HROs were uncomfortable working in and around the military CMOC. Secondly, the HACC was created to prevent security problems from developing because the CMOC, collocated with the Joint Operations Center (JOC), was in a secure area. HRO assistance requests centered on transportation and security and were coordinated through the HACC. As in Somalia and Rwanda, unity of effort was again achieved; however, problems between JTF Haiti and the HROs did exist.
During relief efforts in Somalia and Rwanda, the U.N. was the lead agent and HA operations were conducted within a familiar framework, this was not the case during the U.S. 
CMOC Location: What Doctrine Says

35
Locating the CMOC within the JTF headquarters will enhance JTF/J2, J3, J4, and J6 coordination while reducing perception problems. Because "The CMOC is not a unit, has no established support structure, and therefore should not be subordinate to a JTF or division: it should remain essentially at staff element." 36 As an equal among equals, the CMOC would be Furthermore, the CMOC would be in a position to directly monitor the status of HRO support requests and would not be subjected to being physically 'overrun' by the multitude of relief agencies operating within the region. While specific counter-arguments to the parallel civil-military operations centers concept were not discovered during research, general comments debating the feasibility of this argument can be cultivated based on the content of the material reviewed.
Parallel Civil Military Operations Centers: The HOC
The first counter-argument focuses on whether or not the U.S. State Department would be willing to take the lead and set up the HOC during U.N. led HA operations. As discussed, JP 3-08 identifies USAID as the lead agent for forming a HOC during unilateral U.S. missions. Whether or not USAID would be willing to assume HOC responsibility during U.N. led humanitarian relief efforts requires coordination with the State Department.
The majority of information found discussing CMOC location was from an ownership perspective. Arguments recommended collocating the CMOC with the JTF/J3, J4, and J5. In While there may be a designated spot, the process naturally occurs according to the moment and the personalities." 45 In contrast to moving the CMOC out to the HROs, an alternate argument advocates collocating the HROs with the CMOC in the JTF headquarters.
Proponents of this scenario contend that cooperation between the JTF and HROs would be greatly improved if military planners had greater access to the multiple relief agencies operating in the region.
Conclusion
In the final analysis, the parallel civil-military operations centers concept represents the next evolutionary step in standardizing doctrine focused on enhancing unity of effort between the U.S. military and HROs during HA operations. As General Shalikashvili stated, success during humanitarian relief efforts is a two-way street. It is imperative doctrine be instituted to maximize the opportunity for success. 
